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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T STATE 040087

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2033
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [ETTC](#) [MTCRE](#) [KSCA](#) [GM](#) [IR](#)

SUBJECT: (S) PROVIDING THE FRG CLARIFICATION ON ROLES OF
ENTITIES INVOLVED IN TEST CHAMBER PROCUREMENT CASE

REF: A. 05 STATE 201650
[B](#). 05 BERLIN 3726
[C](#). 05 STATE 211408
[D](#). 05 BERLIN 3954
[E](#). 06 STATE 36325
[F](#). 06 BERLIN 674
[G](#). 06 STATE 62278
[H](#). 06 BERLIN 1123
[I](#). 06 STATE 70328
[J](#). 06 BERLIN 1229
[K](#). 06 BERLIN 1550
[L](#). MTCR POC 201/2006 - MAY 16 2006
[M](#). 07 STATE 75839
[N](#). 07 BERLIN 1137
[O](#). 07 STATE 108420
[P](#). 07 BERLIN 2163
[Q](#). 07 STATE 166482
[R](#). 07 BERLIN 2216
[S](#). STATE 15220
[T](#). BERLIN 195

Classified By: ISN/MTR ACTING DIRECTOR RALPH PALMIERO
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D).

[1](#). (U) This is an action request. Please see
paragraph 4.

[2](#). (S) Background: Since November 2005, we have
worked with German authorities to prevent Iran's solid
propellant missile developer - the Shahid Bakeri
Industrial Group (SBIG) - from procuring environmental
test chambers from the German firm ICS Schneider
Messtechnik (Schneider) (Refs). On February 15, post
delivered Ref S demarche (reporting plans by Schneider
and Iranian procurement firm Rakin to route a test
chamber through the UAE and to falsely list an entity
in Tajikistan as the end-user) to German MFA Export
Control Division Desk Officer Wiebke Wacker. Wacker
indicated that there was confusion within the German
interagency export control working group as to the
identity of the actual Iranian end-user of the
equipment Schneider is conspiring to transfer (Ref T).
She noted that the U.S. has referenced a number of
Iranian entities as being involved in the procurement
process in this case, including Rakin Ltd, Aban
Commercial and Industrial Group, Saba Machinery
Supplying Company, Pooya Commercial and Engineering,
and SBIG, and asked if the U.S. could provide
clarification on this point.

[3](#). (S) Objectives: We want to advise German officials
that while SBIG is the governmental entity with primary
responsibility for Iran's solid-propellant ballistic
missile program, it employs various front companies
(alternative names) in order to disguise its identity
as the ultimate/actual end-user. Aban, Saba, and Pooya
are some of the front companies that SBIG has used in
its attempts to procure the test chamber from
Schneider. We also want to advise our FRG
interlocutors that Rakin Ltd. has been acting as an
intermediary in this case. Unlike Aban, Saba, and
Pooya, it is not directly affiliated with SBIG,

although it has played a key role in the network that has been working to procure the test chamber for SBIG.

14. (S) Action Request: Department requests Embassy Berlin approach appropriate host government officials to deliver the talking points in Paragraph 5 and report response. Talking points may also be left as a non-paper.

15. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL GERMANY)

-- Since November 2005, we have been discussing with you efforts by Iran's Rakin Ltd. to procure environmental and temperature shock chambers from the German firm ICS Schneider Messtechnik on behalf of Iran's missile program.

-- In a February 15 meeting, we advised you that ICS Schneider and the Iranian procurement firm Rakin Ltd. had made plans to route a test chamber intended for Iran's missile program through the UAE and to falsely list Tajikistan as the equipment's final destination.

-- During this meeting, you indicated that there was confusion within the German interagency working group as to which Iranian entity was the actual end-user of the equipment Schneider was conspiring to transfer.

-- You noted that we had referred to a number of Iranian entities as being involved in the procurement process in this case, including Rakin Ltd., Saba Machinery Supply Company, Pooya Commercial and Engineering, and the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG), and asked if we could provide clarification on this point.

-- We now want to provide the following information:

-- We understand that the intended end-user of the environmental shock chamber is the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG). SBIG is the governmental entity with overall responsibility for the development of Iran's solid-propellant ballistic missiles.

-- However, SBIG - which has been sanctioned under United Nations Security Resolution 1737 and is well-known as a developer of ballistic missiles - employs front companies (alternate names) in order to disguise its identity as the actual end-user from potential suppliers and governmental officials in those suppliers' countries.

-- Among the front companies or alternate names used by SBIG are the following entities we have mentioned in our discussions with you:

- Aban Commercial and Industrial Group
- Saba Machinery Supplying Co.
- Pooya Commercial and Engineering

-- Rakin Ltd. is an entity that acts as an intermediary between the supplying firm (ICS Schneider) and the end-user (SBIG). While not directly affiliated with SBIG, Rakin plays a key role in the network that has been working to procure the test chamber for SBIG.

-- We hope that this information is useful to you, and are grateful for your continued cooperation on this case.

-- We look forward to hearing of any actions your government takes in response to this information.

End talking points/non-paper.

16. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann

with any questions or follow-up related to this case
(202-647-1430 - herrmannjp2@state.gov or
herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov) and slug reporting on this
issue for ISN/MTR, EUR/AGS and EUR/PRA.

17. (U) A word version of this document will be posted
at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
RICE

NNNN

End Cable Text